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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Circuits are split as to whether there is a specific
intent requirement for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (“Section
1001”). The crux of the split amongst the Federal Circuits relies mainly
on the “willfulness” element listed in Section 1001. Courts that have
interpreted the “willfulness” element narrowly have held that this burden is met if it is proven that the defendant made the statement with
* B.S., State University of New York at Empire State College; M.B.A., Northeastern
University D’Amore-McKim School of Business; J.D./M.J., Michigan State University College of Law. The Author would like to thank Maria Filipakis; Kathleen A. Cunningham,
Blank Rome; Anthony Mingione, Blank Rome; Rustin Paul, Concord Specialty Risk; Megan
Filoon, Molecular Templates, Inc.; and last but certainly not least, the editors, staff, and
faculty advisor of the Florida A & M University Law Review.
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the knowledge that it is was false.1 Courts that interpreted the “willfulness” element broadly have held that the “willfulness” element
requires a specific intent, which is defined as the “intent to deceive.”2
Section 1001 is part of a comprehensive classification of crimes
colloquially referred to as “process offenses,” which also include contempt, perjury, and failure to appear.3 Process offenses are criminal
offenses that interfere with the procedures of the justice system.4 The
purpose of criminalizing process offenses is to preserve the integrity of
the justice system.5
The plain language of Section 1001 makes no mention of intent
and states as follows:
1. See, e.g., United States v. Riccio, 529 F.3d 40, 46-47 (1st Cir. 2008) (“willfulness” in
§ 1001 means “nothing more . . . than that the defendant knew that his statement was false
when he made it or—which amounts in law to the same thing—consciously disregarded or
averted his eyes from its likely falsity.”) (quoting United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64, 72
(1st Cir. 2006)); United States v. Daughtry, 48 F.3d 829, 831-32 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated on
other grounds, 516 U.S. 984 (1995), reinstated in relevant part, 91 F.3d 675 (4th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1986) (§ 1001 requires a “false representation . . . . that . . . is made with an intent to deceive or mislead.”); United States v.
Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hildebrandt, 961 F.2d 116, 11819 (8th Cir. 1992); (“willful” in § 1001“simply means that the defendant did the forbidden
act ‘deliberately and with knowledge.’ It is not necessary that the defendant act with the
intent to deceive the United States . . . .”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 878
(1992); United States v. Verduzco-Contreras, No. 88–5120, 1990 WL 34147, at *3 (9th Cir.
Mar. 27, 1990) (“[T]he government need not prove intent to deceive under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001.”) (citing United States. v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485, 1490 (9th Cir. 1986)); United
States v. Tatoyan, 474 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Russo, No. 98-3245,
2000 WL 14298, at *5 (10th Cir. Jan. 10, 2000) (“willful” in § 1001 “does not require proof of
evil intent but rather only that ‘the act [was] done deliberately and with knowledge.’”)
(quoting Walker v. United States, 192 F.2d 47, 49 (10th Cir. 1951)).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 160 (2nd Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 1004 (2004); United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053, 1059 n.1 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 924 (1991); United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 212 (3rd Cir. 2009)
(“The record in this case contains sufficient evidence . . . that [the defendant] acted deliberately and with knowledge that the representations contained in the air-monitoring reports
. . . were false and he was aware . . . that his conduct was unlawful.”); United States v.
Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1986) (§ 1001 requires a “false representation is one . . .
made with an intent to deceive or mislead.”); United States v. Geisen, 612 F.3d 471, 487 (6th
Cir. 2010) (§ 1001 requires that the “statement was made with knowledge of its falsity, and
an ‘intent to deceive.’”) (citations omitted); United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 503
(11th Cir. 1982) (“Proof that the defendant has the specific intent to deceive by making a
false or fraudulent statement is a prerequisite to conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.”) (citing
United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1286 (5th Cir. 1976)); United States v. Moore, 612
F.3d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
3. See Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L. J. 1533, 1612 (1997).
4. See generally Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L. J. 1215,
1218 (2004).
5. See generally Joel Feinberg, 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMS TO
OTHERS 63 (1984).
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(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial
branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the
same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years or,
if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism (as defined in section 2331), imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both. If
the matter relates to an offense under chapter 109A, 109B, 110, or
117, or section 1591, then the term of imprisonment imposed under
this section shall be not more than 8 years.

(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or
that party’s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in
that proceeding.
(c) With respect to any matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative
branch, subsection (a) shall apply only to—
(1) administrative matters, including a claim for payment, a
matter related to the procurement of property or services, personnel or employment practices, or support services, or a
document required by law, rule, or regulation to be submitted to
the Congress or any office or officer within the legislative
branch; or
(2) any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of
the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House or
Senate.6
Section 1035 was modeled after Section 1001 and created specifically
for allegations involving heath care.7 Section 1035 states:
6. See 18 U.S.C. §1001 (2006).
7. United States v. Natale, 719 F.3d. 719, 733 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The language of 18
U.S.C. § 1001(a) also supports this conclusion. The health care benefit program requirement
is the jurisdictional element of § 1035. It largely tracks, both in words used and placement
within the statute, the jurisdictional element of § 1001(a). Compare § 1035(a) (‘[w]hoever, in
any matter involving a health care benefit program . . .’), with § 1001(a) (‘whoever, in any
matter within the jurisdiction of . . . [a] branch of the Government of the United States
. . . .’”) (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted).
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(a) Whoever, in any matter involving a health care benefit program,
knowingly and willfully—
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; or
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any materially false
writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry,
in connection with the delivery of or payment for health
care benefits, items, or services, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
(b) As used in this section, the term “health care benefit program” has
the meaning given such term in section 24(b) of this title.8
One court notes that the Supreme Court of the United States
(“SCOTUS”) has previously not found specific intent to be required
under similar language within Section 1001.9 While there are many
similarities between Sections 1001 and 1035, there are salient differences. Notwithstanding the differences, this Article argues that
Sections 1001 and 1035 should be interpreted without “intent to
deceive” and rather be interpreted as a strict liability offense.
This argument began with Part I, which provided a brief introduction regarding specific intent under Sections 1001 and 1035. Part II
examines the purpose of criminalizing false statements, which identifies why the statute should be interpreted narrowly. Part III analyzes
case law and how the Federal Circuits have interpreted the statute.
Part IV discusses how Sections 1001 and 1035 meet the required elements to be classified as a public welfare offense. Part V analyzes why
it is malapropos for the Department of Justice to trumpet their views
on the law, and how it crosses the line of the separation of powers. Part
VI identifies the “exculpatory no” doctrine, which the Supreme Court
ultimately rejected, as an example of courts going beyond the plain
meaning interpretation of the statute. Part VII explores the materiality requirement of the statute, and how courts have interpreted it. Part
VIII provides conclusive thoughts and analysis.

8.
9.

See 18 U.S.C. §1035 (1996).
United States v. Starnes, 583 F. 3d 196 (3d Cir. 2009).
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Originally enacted during the Civil War in 1863, the purpose of
Section 1001 was to prohibit members of the military from filing fraudulent claims against the government.10 In 1874, Congress amended the
statute and significantly broadened its coverage to prohibit all persons
from filing fraudulent claims against the government.11 In 1918, Congress made two pertinent Amendments to Section 1001. First, it stated
that corporations may be found liable under the statute as a class of
“persons.”12 Second, it expanded the statute beyond filing fraudulent
claims to also encompass purposeful and intentional “cheating and
swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States.”13
In 1926, SCOTUS narrowly interpreted the term “cheating and
swindling or defrauding the Government of the United States” by holding that it is only applicable to “cheating the Government out of
property or money.”14 The first mention of “intent to defraud” is in
United States v. Cohen when SCOTUS observed that the statute identifies intent in the context of ‘cheating and swindling, to steal or
purloin, and to defraud’ when it cites Section 25 of the Penal Code.15
This narrow interpretation would render the statute toothless several
years later, in light of the New Deal.16
In 1934, Congress revised the statute by removing the property
and financial fraud requirement.17 The Secretary of Interior, Harold
10. See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 696-97 (1863) (currently codified under
18 U.S.C. §1001 (2006)).
11. Under the codification of Dec. 1, 1873, approved June 22, 1874, R. S. § 5438, the
statute was extended to cover “every person”—not merely military personnel (currently
codified under 18 U.S.C. §1001 (2006)).
12. See Act of Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, 40 Stat. 1015, 1015-16 (1918).
13. See id.
14. United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1926) (emphasis added).
15. Id. at n.1.
16. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 80 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (The
Secretary of the Interior, in particular, expressed concern that “there were at present no
statutes outlawing, for example, the presentation of false documents and statements to the
Department of the Interior in connection with the shipment of ‘hot oil,’ or to the Public
Works Administration in connection with the transaction of business with that agency.”).
17. See Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, § 35, Pub. L. No. 394, 48 Stat. 996 (1934) (amending Act of Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, § 35, Pub. L. No. 228, 40 Stat. 1015 (1918)). The Act stated
in relevant part: “[W]hoever shall knowingly and willfully falsify or conceal or cover up by
any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or make or cause to be made any false or fraudulent statements or representations, or make or use or cause to be made or used any false
bill, receipt, voucher, roll, account, claim, certificate, affidavit, or deposition, knowing the
same to contain any fraudulent or fictitious statement or entry, in any matter within the
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Ickes, played a significant role in pushing for this revision. Secretary
Ickes was motivated to have a law in order “to prosecute ‘for the presentation of false papers.’ ”18 The statute was broadened to include “any
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States.”19 Thus, the statute criminalizes false statements that
do not result in any property or pecuniary harm.
In 1941, SCOTUS acknowledged that the statute may be interpreted more broadly in light of the 1934 revision.20 In United States v.
Gilliland, the defendant submitted false reports regarding the petroleum amount produced by certain oil wells.21 SCOTUS, relying on
legislative history, held that the statute was meant to be interpreted
broadly and is no longer limited to the requirement of governmental
pecuniary or property loss.22 SCOTUS further noted that a narrow interpretation of the statute may frustrate the legislative intent.23
In 1948, the statute was amended again when Congress sundered the false claims and false statements provisions.24 In 1996, the
statute was amended again, as Congress renamed it the False Statements Account Accountability Act of 1996 and added a material
requirement in each subsection under section (a).25
One reason as to why courts are looking beyond the plain language of the text is because there is a notion that the language of
Sections 1001 and 1035 are overbroad and may lead to a wide swath of
criminalizing behavior that is beyond Congressional intent. In a concurring opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg alleges that Section
1001 gives prosecutors “extraordinary authority” to “manufacture
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or of any corporation in which
the United States of America is a stockholder . . . .”
18. See Letter from Harold L. Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior, to Henry F. Ashurst,
the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate (Feb. 7, 1934) S. Rep. No. 288, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess.; 78 Cong. Rec., Pt. 3, p. 2859; see also H. Rep. No.829, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
19. See Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 587, § 35, Pub. L. No. 394, 48 Stat. 996 (1934) (amending Act of Oct. 23, 1918, ch. 194, § 35, Pub. L. No. 228, 40 Stat. 1015 (1918)).
20. See United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941).
21. Id. at 87.
22. Id. at 93 (“The amendment eliminated the words ‘cheating and swindling’ and
broadened the provision so as to leave no adequate basis for the limited construction which
had previously obtained.”).
23. Id. (“The amendment indicated the congressional intent to protect the authorized
functions of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices described. We see no reason why this apparent intention
should be frustrated by construction.”).
24. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 285, Pub. L. No. 772, 62 Stat. 683, 698 (1948);
see also Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1001, Pub. L. No. 772, 62 Stat. 683, 749 (1948).
25. See False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-292, 110 Stat.
3459 (1996) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\14-2\FAM201.txt

2020

unknown

Seq: 7

EXAMINING SPECIFIC INTENT

7-DEC-21

17:18

277

crimes.”26 Justice Ginsburg does acknowledge that the plain meaning
of the statute does not allow for intent to be read into the statute.27
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg does not acknowledge the materiality requirement, which does offer a defense for those charged with making
false statements that they claim are not essential to what prosecutors
are seeking.28
The statute has an intriguing history, with critiques about the
statute at opposite ends of extremes: being too narrowly tailored or being overly broad. While some criminal statutes have a mens rea read
into them if the statute is silent as to which mens rea is necessary, this
does not hold true for public welfare offenses.29 Notwithstanding, if intent was read into the statute, it should require the speaker to have
intended to make the statement rather than possess an intent to defraud, which is rather a motive.
II. CURRENT STATE

OF THE

LAW

Courts that read an “intent to deceive” requirement into Sections 1001 and 1035 are interpreting the statutes beyond their plain
meaning. The “intent to deceive” requirement being read into Sections
1001 and 1035 are within the intent element, specifically the “knowingly and willfully” language.30
26. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“I
write separately, however, to call attention to the extraordinary authority Congress, perhaps unwittingly, has conferred on prosecutors to manufacture crimes.”).
27. Id. at 412.
28. See id. at 408-12.
29. See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 (1994) (reiterating that
public welfare statutes may dispense with a “mental element”); see also Liparota v. United
States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985) (stating that a public welfare offense is “a type of conduct
that a reasonable person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may
seriously threaten the community’s health or safety.”).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 160 (2nd Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 1004 (2004); United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053, 1059 n.1 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 924 (1991); United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 212 (3rd Cir. 2009)
(“The record in this case contains sufficient evidence . . . that [the defendant] acted deliberately and with knowledge that the representations contained in the air-monitoring reports
. . . were false and he was aware . . . that his conduct was unlawful.”); United States v.
Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1986) (§ 1001 requires a “false representation is one . . .
made with an intent to deceive or mislead.”); United States v. Geisen, 612 F.3d 471, 487 (6th
Cir. 2010) (§ 1001 requires that the “statement was made with knowledge of its falsity, and
an ‘intent to deceive.’”) (citations omitted); United States v. Dothard, 666 F.2d 498, 503
(11th Cir. 1982) (“Proof that the defendant has the specific intent to deceive by making a
false or fraudulent statement is a prerequisite to conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.”) (citing
United States v. Lange, 528 F.2d 1280, 1286 (5th Cir. 1976)); United States v. Moore, 612
F.3d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\14-2\FAM201.txt

278

unknown

Seq: 8

FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW

7-DEC-21

17:18

Vol. 14:2:271

SCOTUS has held that the term “knowingly” does not necessarily have any reference to a culpable state of mind or to knowledge of
the law.31 Additionally, SCOTUS has held that term “willfully” means
that the actor commits an act that is unlawful but does not need to
know that his act is unlawful.32 Alternatively, the stance of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) on the interpretation of “willfully” is that the
defendant knew his or her statement was unlawful–not just that the
statement was false.33 The Solicitor General reiterates this position in
its’ briefs in Ajoku v. United States and Russell v. United States, and
Natale v. United States.34 Section 1001 requires proof the defendant
knew his or her conduct was unlawful: “[I]t is now the view of the
United States that the “willfully” element of Sections 1001 and 1035
requires proof that the defendant made a false statement with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”35 Having to show that the person
knew making a false statement was unlawful violates the general rule
that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is not a defense to criminal prosecution.36 SCOTUS has explicitly stated that if Congress

31. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 192 (1998); see also Wilson R. Huhn, In Defense of the Roosevelt Court, 2 FLA. AGRIC. & MECH. UNIV. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (discussing how
the favored canons of construction of SCOTUS Justices has a profound impact on the law).
32. Id. at 192-93.
33. United States v. Ajoku, 584 F. App’x 824 (9th Cir. 2014) (““As conceded by the government in its opposition brief to Ajoku’s petition for certiorari, the district court erred by
giving an instruction on the element of “willfulness” that does not comply with Bryan v.
United States. See 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998) (“As a general matter, when used in the
criminal context, a willful act is one undertaken with a bad purpose. In other words, in
order to establish a willful violation of a statute, the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.” (footnote and internal quotation
marks omitted)). It is thus undisputed that Ajoku’s jury received an erroneous
instruction.”).
34. Brief for the United States in Opp’n, Ajoku v. United States, 572 U.S. 1056 (2014)
(No. 13-7264), 2014 WL 1571930, at *11. “In three recent briefs opposing certiorari, DOJ
announced that it now views the “willfully” element of Sections 1001 and 1035 as requiring
proof that the defendant made a false statement with knowledge that his conduct was false.
See Ajoku v. United States, No. 13-7264, Russell v. United States, No. 13-7357, and Natale v.
United States, No. 13-744.” https://www.wiley.law/newsletter-4992.
35. Brief for the United States in Opp’n, Natale v. United States, No. 13-744, 2014 WL
1018796, at *10.
36. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 182 (1820) (Livingston, J., dissenting); see also Barlow v. United States, 32 U.S. 404, 411 (1833); see also Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minn., 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910); see
also Lambert v. Cal., 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419, 441 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON
LAW 47-48 (1881).
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intended for an “intent to deceive” element to be in Section 1001, it
would have included the phrase when it amended the statute.37
A. Narrow Interpretation
1. First Circuit
The First Circuit has held that Section 1001’s requirement of
“knowingly and willful” is met if the defendant deliberately made the
statement with knowledge that it was false.38 In United States v. Riccio, the court upheld defendant-Riccio’s conviction for violating Section
1001 by submitting a false statement to a federal agency, the Transportation Security Agency (“TSA”).39 Appellant-Riccio worked at WalMart from December 2003 through February 2004, and then claimed
that he suffered a back injury on the job and began to collect workers’
compensation until October 2005.40 The workers’ compensation claim
lasted from October 2005 until February 2007.41 In July 2004, Riccio
began employment with the TSA while collecting workers compensation.42 Riccio claims he merely forgot about his employment with WalMart.43 The prosecution argued this was not plausible because Riccio
was engaged in litigation with Wal-Mart at the time.44 Moreover, the
prosecution noted that Wal-Mart’s discovery of Ricco’s employment
with the TSA could have compromised his workers’ compensation
lawsuit.45
Riccio’s argument on appeal was that the district court erred
with regard to jury instructions when it omitted the scienter require37. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 73 (1984) (“Noticeably lacking from this
enactment is any requirement that the prohibited conduct be undertaken with specific intent to deceive the Federal Government, or with actual knowledge that false statements
were made in a matter within federal agency jurisdiction. If Congress had intended to impose either requirement, it would have modified the prior bill by replacing the phrase ‘with
intent to defraud the United States’ with the phrase ‘with intent to deceive the United
States,’ or by inserting the phrase ‘knowing such statements to be in any matter within the
jurisdiction of any federal agency.’ That Congress did not include such language, either in
the 1934 enactment or in the 1948 revision, provides convincing evidence that the statute
does not require actual knowledge of federal involvement.”).
38. United States v. Riccio, 529 F.3d 40, 46-47 (1st Cir. 2008).
39. Id. at 41-42.
40. Id. at 42.
41. Id. at n.1.
42. Id. at 42.
43. Id. at 43.
44. Riccio, 529 F.3d 40, at 43.
45. Id.
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ment (“knowingly and willfully”) on the verdict form.46 The court
rejected this argument and held that the scienter requirement was satisfied when Riccio “submitted a false SF-86 Form and that he did so
intentionally.”47 If the court had held that there was an “intent to
deceive” requirement, the decision may have come out in favor of Riccio. This is because Ricco was suing Wal-Mart, in which the court
doubted the merit of the claim due.48 Thus, the intent would be construed to possibly defraud a private actor, Wal-Mart, and not the
government. Nevertheless, Riccio claimed that he was mistaken when
he filled out the forms,49 and thus he would not have the specific intent
required to deceive or defraud the government. Ignorantia facti excusa
(ignorance of a fact is an excuse, or mistake of fact) “is determined not
by the actual facts but by the actor’s opinion regarding them.”50
2. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit used a plain meaning interpretation of the
term “willfully” when it held that it does not require specific intent.51
In United States v. Daughtry, the defendant’s sole argument was that
“willfully” under Section 1001 should be interpreted with specific intent.52 The Daughtry court’s analysis compares Section 1001 with 31
U.S.C. § 5322(a) (“Section 5322”) and lead to the determination that
“willingly” is a modifier.53 The court held that, with regard to Section
1001, “willingly” modifies “falsifies, conceals or covers up,” which does
not indicate intent.54 With regard to Section 5322, “willingly” modifies
“violating,” which indicates that a person must act “deliberately and
intentionally.”55

46. Id. at 47.
47. Id. at 46.
48. Id. at 43.
49. See id. at 43.
50. Jerome Hall, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1957).
51. United States v. Daughtry, 48 F.3d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Nothing in the language or structure of § 1001 indicates that one may violate § 1001 only by acting with
knowledge of the existence of the law and an intent to violate or disregard it.”), vacated on
other grounds, 516 U.S. 984 (1995), and reinstated in relevant part, 91 F.3d 675 (4th Cir.
1996).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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The Daughtry court noted that “willfully” may come to have different meanings in the context of different statutes.56 In the context of
Section 1001, the Fourth Circuit notes that SCOTUS came to the conclusion that a defendant need not have knowledge that they made a
false statement within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.57 Utilizing
this logic, the Daughtry court held that a harmonious reading of the
statute would not require that a defendant had knowledge that their
conduct, a statement, is unlawful.58 It would be incongruent to hold
that the term “violating” can alter the interpretation of “willfully” to
require specific intent, yet the terms “falsifies,” “conceals,” or “covers
up” do not.
SCOTUS has come to a similar interpretation of “willfully” as a
modifier in a statute.59 In Ratzlaf v. United States, the Court noted
that “willfully” under Section 5322 modifies evading report requirements of financial institutions.60 Structuring transactions for money
laundering purposes is a sophisticated act that requires a certain level
of skill.61 Additionally, there is a reporting requirement on behalf of
the financial institutions.62 Thus, the statute creates a legal duty.63 It
56. See id. (“We do not believe that Ratzlaf controls the definition of the term “willfully” in the context of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001. In 31 U.S.C.A. § 5322(a), the word ‘willfully’
modifies ‘violat[es],’ indicating that an individual must deliberately and intentionally violate the currency structuring laws in order to be convicted. In significant contrast, in § 1001
the word ‘willfully’ modifies, inter alia, ‘falsifies, conceals or covers up . . . a material fact, or
makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements.’ Nothing in the language or structure
of § 1001 indicates that one may violate § 1001 only by acting with knowledge of the existence of the law and an intent to violate or disregard it.”) (alteration in original) (omission in
original).
57. Daughtry, 48 F.3d at 832.
58. Id.
59. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137-38 (1994).
60. Id. at 140.; see also Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570,
§ 1354, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-22 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2000)).
61. United States v. All Funds on Deposit in Any Accounts Maintained at Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 801 F. Supp. 984, 987–89 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (detailing a sophisticated money laundering scheme of another narcotics-trafficking organization); see
also Business Community’s Compliance with Federal Money Laundering Statutes: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 101st Cong. 178–90
(1990).
62. Internal Revenue Service Form No. 4789 (Currency Transaction Reports (“CTR”)).
Financial institutions are required to provide the requested information pursuant to 31
C.F.R. §§ 103.22, 103.26-.27 (1987); see also Money Laundering Operations and the Role of
the Department of the Treasury: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm.
on Ways & Means, 99th Cong. 56–58 (1985) (statement of James Knapp, Deputy Assistant
Att’y Gen., Criminal Division, Department of Justice: Congress should enact money-laundering legislation so that the “emphasis will shift from investigating and prosecuting
violations of currency reporting and recordkeeping statutes to attacking persons and institutions who knowingly ‘launder’ the profits of illicit enterprises”); PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON
ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND
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also gives credence that a financial institution has the knowledge of
what it is doing and what its’ duties and responsibilities are, as per the
legal duty that it is under, which is why the term “violates” is in the
statute.64 Notably, Section 1001 does not create a legal duty and therefore, does not have the term “violate” in it.65 Hence, Section 1001 does
not need to have intent read into the statute, as that would be going
beyond a plain meaning interpretation of the statute.
3. Seventh Circuit
Opposing certiorari in Natale v. United States, the Solicitor
General’s brief argues that the interpretation of “willfully” does not require a “specific intent to deceive.”66 Notwithstanding, the DOJ is
aware that their newfound interpretation of “willfully” may have unintended implications and have offered some rather confusing syllogism.
In its’ brief, the Solicitor General warned against interpreting the term
“willfully” to have the same meaning when used in other criminal statues, as “[c]ontext and history may support a different interpretation
. . . .”67 Thus, the Solicitor General confessed that the DOJ is advocating for a definition of “willfully” that goes beyond its plain meaning,
and is also concerned about how this newfound definition could have
deleterious effects if used in other statutes. Notwithstanding, SCOTUS
has held that the government must be able to justify using a different
MONEY LAUNDERING 8 (1984); see, e.g., Sarah N. Welling, Money Laundering: The AntiStructuring Laws, 44 ALA. L. REV. 787, 791 (1993); Radley Balko, The Federal ‘Structuring’
Laws are Smurfin’ Ridiculous, WASHINGTON POST TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014, 4:01 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/03/24/the-federal-structuring-laws-aresmurfin-ridiculous/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.de93815f5eab.
63. See Bank Records and Foreign Transaction Act (BRFTA), Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84
Stat. 1114 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31
U.S.C.); Report of International Transportation of Currency, Customs Form No. 4790, is
required to be filed pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(l)(B).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 1984) (The
court observed “Congress no doubt made the failure to file CTRs a specific intent crime
because, without knowledge of the reporting requirement, a would-be violator cannot be
expected to recognize the illegality of his otherwise innocent act.”); see also Lamie v. United
States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 537 (2004) (courts should not add an “absent word” to a statute; “there is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress’ silence and rewriting
rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted”).
65. Id.
66. Brief for the United States in Opp’n, Natale v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1875 (2014)
(No. 13-744), 2014 WL 1018796 at *9-11.
67. Brief for the United States in Opp’n, supra note 34, at *15.
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meaning of a word from its regular meaning.68 The Fifth Circuit has
defined “willfully” as an act done deliberately and with knowledge.69
Furthermore, the fact that Congress did not define “willfully” in the
statute leads one to believe that it intended for the term to be interpreted using its regular meaning, as it is in other statutes.70
4. Eighth Circuit
Similar to the Fourth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit has held that
“willfully” modifies Section 1001, but it does not require an “intent to
deceive.”71 In United States v. Hildebrandt, the defendant was a
farmer who ran into significant financial trouble and had his property
foreclosed on.72 Following the teachings of Roger Elvick, Hildebrant
sent IRS Form 1099 to persons he claimed he paid in non-wage compensation, totaling about $68,000,000.73 Hildebrand testified that he
believed the 1099 forms he filed were not false.74 The court ultimately
ruled that “willful” under Section 1001 is the “the willful doing of a
prohibited act,”75 which is how strict liability statutes are interpreted.76 The court reasoned that “knowingly and willfully” modifies
68. Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1270 (2010) (“[A]nd we ‘do not force
term-of-art definitions into contexts where they plainly do not fit and produce nonsense,’”)
(quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 282 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see also
Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 257 (1981) (“Contradictory interpretations of
substantially identical definitions do not serve that interest. It would be extraordinary for a
Congress pursuing this interest to intend, without ever saying so, for identical definitions to
be interpreted differently.”) (emphasis added).
69. See McClanahan v. United States, 230 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 824 (1956); see also McBride v. United States, 225 F.2d 249, 254-55 (5th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 934 (1956).
70. See Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 262 (“We conclude that Treas. Reg.
§§ 31.3121(a)-1(f) and 31.3306(b)-1(f) fail to implement the statutory definition of ‘wages’ in a
consistent or reasonable manner. The plain language and legislative histories of the relevant
Acts indicate that Congress intended its definition to be interpreted in the same manner for
FICA and FUTA as for income-tax withholding.”) (emphasis added).
71. United States v. Hildebrandt, 961 F.2d 116, 118-19 (8th Cir. 1992).
72. Id. at 117.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 117-18.
75. Id. at 118.
76. Id.; See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West 2019), which provides in relevant
part: “a person who willfully and lewdly commits any lewd and lascivious act . . . upon or
with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14 years,
with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of
that person or the child, is guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for a term of three, six, or eight years.” (emphasis added) (omission added).
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“false statement”, but it does not mean it is necessary to prove that the
defendant acted with the intent to deceive the United States.77
If the court were to hold that the government must prove a defendant had the “intent to deceive,” Hildebrant may not have been
convicted under Section 1001. Elvick put together audiotapes, videotapes, and printed materials that explained his scheme, which
Hildebrant relied upon when he filled out the 1099 forms.78 In another
case, Elvick had an elaborate scheme where people would claim significant refunds from their tax returns and execute counterfeit
instruments purporting to be certified by the IRS.79 Elvick would then
negotiate the counterfeit instruments for legitimate instruments.80
With Elvick’s history, it is plausible that Hildebrant could claim
he legitimately believed what he was told by Elvick and, thus, could
not have had an “intent to deceive.” Under this logic, the statute would
be effortlessly circumvented if a person could claim that they relied on
someone else when they made a false statement, which would easily
negate the requisite “intent to deceive”. Thus, the person would have
no responsibility for the statements they made to government officials.
5. Ninth Circuit
In United States v. Tatoyan, the court found that the “knowingly and willfully” requirement of Section 1001 was met if the
government could prove the defendant made the statement with
knowledge that it was false.81 In Tatoyan, a United States Customs
Inspector at an airport informed the defendants, who were scheduled
for an international flight, that if they were carrying more than
$10,000 they were required to fill out a form.82 The first defendant replied he was carrying $8,000 and the second defendant stated she was
carrying $10,000.83 It was discovered that the defendants attempted to
smuggle $17,601 and $43,717, respectively, in undeclared currency out
of the United States.84 The court observed the defendants’ concealment
77. Hildebrandt, 961 F.2d at 118-19.
78. See id. at 117.
79. United States v. Wiley, 979 F.2d 365, 366 (5th Cir. 1992).
80. Id.
81. United States v. Tatoyan, 474 F.3d 1174, 1179 (9th Cir. 2007).; Section 1001 has
also been enforced against false oral statement made to Customs officials at airports (E.g.,
United States v. Cutaia, 511 F. Supp. 619, 620 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Pereira, 463
F. Supp. 481, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)).
82. Id. at 1176.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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of the money they failed to report was sufficient to support their convictions.85 The court ultimately determined that the defendants
intentionally made false statements because the United States Customs Inspector required them fill out a form since they were carrying
more than $10,000.
The court opined that intent is not required, discerning that requiring intent may possibly render the statute toothless.86 In Tatoyan,
the defendants contended that they were going to give the money to a
family member in need of financial help.87 “The government presented
no evidence at trial to contradict this or to establish that the funds
were related to any illicit activity.”88 If the prosecution was required to
show that the defendants were trying to defraud the government, the
statute could be easily manipulated in the context of making false
statements when taking money out of the country is involved. “[T]here
[i]s no law against taking money out of the United States.”89 Thus,
since there is no law against taking money out of the country, it would
be legally impossible to defraud the government by not declaring
money.
B. Broad Interpretation
1. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit has mistakenly read the legislative history
of Section 1001 as showing that Congress intended for it to be interpreted broadly.90 In United States v. Bakhtiari, the court’s rationale
that the statute should be interpreted broadly came from the amendments by Congress after United States v. Cohn.91 The Second Circuit
freely admits that after Cohn, Congress eliminated specific intent
when it removed the government pecuniary or property loss requirement.92 The court is confused as it is implementing specific intent
when it claims that a defendant needs to have knowledge of the general unlawfulness of the conduct at issue.93 A precise reading of the
85. Id. at 1178.
86. Tatoyan, 474 F.3d 1180-81.
87. Id. at 1177.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1176.
90. United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053, 1061 (2d Cir. 1990).
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. See id. (“In addition, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the jurisdictional clause of § 1001 should be given a broad interpretation. “There is no indication in
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legislative history shows that Congress omitted the government pecuniary or property loss requirement to allow the Government to be able
to capture a larger swath of activity. By reading specific intent into the
statute, it would narrow the reach of the statute as it sets a higher
burden of proof for the prosecution. How then, does the Second Circuit
confess that Congress eliminated specific intent from Section 1001, yet
somehow read it into Section 1001 through somersaults of statutory
interpretation?
2. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit has inappropriately interpreted “knowingly
and willfully” under Section 1001. The Third Circuits asks “[T]he question, then, is, What does ‘knowingly and willfully,’ as used in § 1001(a),
mean?”94 In United States v. Starnes, the court discerns the governments’ concession that it must prove specific intent, and that the
defendant did not make an argument as to what specific intent means
under the statute.95 The court theorizes that the term specific intent is
abstract, and is not always clearly distinguishable from general intent.96 The court reasons that the government has the burden of
proving “knowingly and willfully” beyond a reasonable doubt, and not
specific intent.97 Further, the court explicates that knowingly is
straightforward, whereas willfully “takes color from the text in which
it appears.”98 In the final analysis, the words “knowingly” and “willfully” are interpreted in conjunction, rather than separately, and thus
it requires the Government to prove that the defendant knew their underlying conduct was unlawful.99
SCOTUS has previously ruled that the “ ‘most natural reading’
of the statute evidences that ‘knowingly and willfully’ applied only to
either the committee reports or in the congressional debates that the scope of the statute
was to be in any way restricted.”). Moreover, ‘[i]n the unlikely event that § 1001 could be the
basis for imposing an unduly harsh result on those who intentionally make false statements
to the Federal Government, it is for Congress and not this Court to amend the criminal
statute.’” (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
94. United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 210 (3rd. Cir. 2009).
95. Id. at 209.
96. See id. at 209 (explaining that “while the ‘traditional dichotomy of general versus
specific intent’ is a venerable one, in many situations it can be more perplexing than
helpful.”).
97. See id.; see also id. at 210 (citing Third Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instructions § 5.05)
98. Id. at 210 (quoting United States v. Ladish Malting Co., 135 F.3d 484, 487-88 (7th
Cir. 1998).
99. Id. at 210 (citations omitted); see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137
(1994).
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the making of false or fraudulent statements . . . . ”100 Thus, it is evident that the “knowingly and willfully” requirements are not
applicable to specific intent, nor is it necessary that the defendant
knew their underlying conduct was unlawful. Moreover, in criminal
cases the term “willfully” has been interpreted as a modifier as limiting
liability to knowing violations.101 If a defendant makes a false statement, they have knowingly done so, and therefore have knowingly
violated the statute. Statutes imposing criminal liability using the
modifier “willfully” and that require specific intent are highly technical
and create a legal duty.102 Sections 1001 and 1035 are not highly technical statutes, and do not create legal duties. Thus, it is inapposite to
interpret these statutes with specific intent.
3. District of Columbia Circuit
In United States v. Moore, Judge Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion breaks precedent in which the District of Columbia held that the
government does not need to prove that the defendant knew their conduct was unlawful.103 Judge Kavanaugh reckons that “[i]n order to
establish a willful violation of a statute, the Government must prove
that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”104 Judge Kavanaugh cites Bryan v. United States, where SCOTUS
held that under 18 U.S.C. § 924 (“Section 924”) the “willfully” element
in Section 1001 requires proof that the defendant knew their conduct
was unlawful.105 Section 924 is distinguished from Section 1001, as
Section 924 focuses exclusively on firearms.106 Judge Kavanaugh then
100. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 435 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 69 n. 6 (1984)).
101. See generally Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994) (noting “the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was
unlawful”); See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998).
102. See generally Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 200-02, (1991) (noting that
“[w]illfulness as construed by our prior decisions in criminal tax cases, requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of
this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.”).
103. United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (establishing that “[f]or some regulatory offenses . . . the Supreme Court has . . .
required affirmative proof of the defendant’s knowledge that his or her conduct was unlawful.”) (citing Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92, (1998)).
104. Id.
105. See id. at 704 (stating “district courts in § 1001 cases . . . require[ ] proof that the
defendant knew his conduct was a crime.”).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (2018). Charges may not be brought under § 924 if the seller is not
a federally licensed dealer. See United States v. Letky, 371 F. Supp. 1286 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
There are gun sellers who are not federally licensed. For instance, people can purchase fire-
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mistakenly implies that Bryan v. United States abrogates United
States v. Hsia, which focuses on Section 1001.107 With regard to Section 1001, in United States v. Hsia, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals held that a plain meaning interpretation of the statue demonstrates that the Government can prove the “knowingly and willfully”
elements by (1) showing the defendant knew the statements made
were false and (2) the defendant intentionally caused such statements
to be made by another.108
If Judge Kavanaugh wanted to look to a Supreme Court case for
analysis on Section 1001, he should have looked to United States v.
Yermian.109 In Yermian, SCOTUS held that a plain meaning interpretation does not support a specific intent under Section 1001.110 In his
concurring opinion, Judge Kavanaugh did not cite a case that focused
on Section 1001, nor did he offer a canon of construction to support his
interpretation of the statute.
III. PUBLIC WELFARE OFFENSES
Public welfare offenses may include, but are not limited to:
criminal nuisances; illegal liquor sales; sales of impure or adulterated
food or drugs; sales of misbranded articles; violations of narcotic laws;
violations of motor-vehicle laws; violations of traffic regulations; and
violations of general police regulations, passed for the safety, health or
well-being of the community.111 SCOTUS has held that public welfare
offenses do not have a scienter requirement.112 Public welfare offenses
are classified as regulatory offenses.113 Judge Brett Kavanaugh issued
arms at gun shows. See Northern Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows v. City of South Bend, 163
F.3d 449 (7th Cir. 1998).
107. Moore, 612 F.3d at 704.
108. United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
109. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 73 (1984).
110. See id. at 74 (noting “[t]here is no indication that the addition of [specific intent]
was intended also to change the meaning of the terms ‘knowingly and willfully’ to require
proof of actual knowledge of federal involvement.”).
111. See generally Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. REV. 55, 73
(1933).
112. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606 (1994) (“Consequently, in the Government’s view, this case fits in a line of precedent concerning what we have termed ‘public
welfare’ or ‘regulatory’ offenses, in which we have understood Congress to impose a form of
strict criminal liability through statutes that do not require the defendant to know the facts
that make his conduct illegal.”); see also Max Birmingham “Strictly for the Birds: The Scope
of Strict Liability Under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,” 13 J. ANIMAL & NAT. RES. L. 1, 12
(2017) (citing “[s]cienter is not an element of criminal liability under the Act’s misdemeanor
provisions.”) (alterations in original).
113. Birmingham, supra note 112.

\\jciprod01\productn\F\FAM\14-2\FAM201.txt

2020

unknown

Seq: 19

EXAMINING SPECIFIC INTENT

7-DEC-21

17:18

289

a concurring opinion in United States v. Moore, in which he states that
Section 1001 is a regulatory statute.114
SCOTUS has acknowledged that there is not a precise definition for public welfare offenses, but held that they are offenses “against
the state, the person, property, or public morals.”115 With regard to
health care fraud, the state and the person, in this instance the person
being the general public, are victimized and it is an act against public
morals. Health care fraud is complex as it often creates a jurisdictional
maze and victimizes patients and payers from various states.116 Citing
certain estimates, Congress observed that health care fraud is a $100
billion problem.117 Congress is worried most about fraud perpetrated
on insurance companies that drives up the cost of health insurance
and, more generally, health care.118 Faced with this problem, Congress
decided it needed to enact legislation to make health care fraud a Federal crime.119 Withal, Congress also did not state a mens rea. Thus, a
consistent interpretation of the statute would be that there is no mens
rea requirement, and that it is a strict liability offense.120 Furthermore, in United States v. Balint, SCOTUS articulated that when the
public is or may be financially injured, the actor may be held strictly
liable.121
Regarding public welfare offenses, it is not necessary to prove
actual injury to the Government or public in order to convict a defendant. Rather, the burden of proof is on the prosecution and requires

114. United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).
115. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255 (1952).
116. Health Care Fraud: All Public & Private Payers Need Federal Criminal Anti-Fraud
Protections, H.R. REP. NO. 104–747, at 1 (1996).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2.
119. Id. at 1.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (2010); see United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 288 (1922) (“If
the offense be a statutory one, and intent or knowledge is not made an element of it, the
indictment need not charge such knowledge or intent.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added)).
121. See generally United States v. Balint, 58 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) (“So, too, in the collection of taxes, the importance to the public of their collection leads the Legislature to impose
on the taxpayer the burden of finding out the facts upon which his liability to pay depends
and meeting it at the peril of punishment.”); see also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 285 (1943) (“Balancing relative hardships, Congress has preferred to place it upon
those who have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than
to throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless.”).
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them to show the defendant violated the law.122 In United States v.
Dotterweich, SCOTUS affirmed the conviction of a corporate officer
who shipped adulterated and misbranded drugs in interstate commerce in violation of a federal statute, even “though consciousness of
wrongdoing [was] totally wanting.”123 Thus, it is not necessary for the
prosecution to show the speaker had the “intent to deceive” the Government when making a false statement. So long as the speaker
“knowingly and willfully” made the statements that is sufficient to determine the speaker violated the statute.124
In 1995, SCOTUS addressed the statutory language of Section
1001 and interpreted it according to the plain meaning rule.125 The
statute, at the time had read, in part, “in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States.”126 In
Hubbard v. United States, the petitioner filed unsworn papers in Bankruptcy Court.127 The Court of Appeals held that there is a “judicial
function” exception under which Section 1001 extends to when false
statements are made to a court while it is performing administrative or
housekeeping functions, but not adjudicative functions.128 SCOTUS re122. J. Manly Parks, The Public Welfare Rationale: Defining Mens Rea in RCRA, 18
WM. & MAR. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 224 n.40 (“If a statute is found to be a public
welfare statute, the lower burden of proof required will necessarily result in a greater ability to enforce the regulations in that statute, at least for cases that go to trial. The state will
be more likely to obtain a conviction if it need only show that a defendant knew what he was
doing, as compared to having to prove that the defendant acted knowing that his act was
unlawful. Some critics have challenged the Court’s reasoning in Balint and Dotterweich,
arguing that enforcement of a non-regulatory statute would be as much obstructed by its
intent requirement as enforcement of a regulatory statute would be. Webber, supra note 5,
at 53.”).
123. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278, 284.
124. Id.
125. See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 702 (1995) (“Prior to amendment, text
read as follows: We think Bramblett must be acknowledged as a seriously flawed decision.
Significantly, the Bramblett Court made no attempt to reconcile its interpretation with the
usual meaning of ‘department.’ It relied instead on a review of the evolution of § 1001 and
its statutory cousin, the false claims statute presently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 287, as providing a ‘context’ for the conclusion that ‘Congress could not have intended to leave frauds such
as [Bramblett’s] without penalty.’ We are convinced that the Court erred by giving insufficient weight to the plain language of §§ 6 and 1001.”) (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
126. See Pub. L. 104-292,18 U.S.C.A § 1001 (West 1996). (“[W]hoever, in any matter
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States, knowingly and
willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or
makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses
any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.”)
127. Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 696.
128. Id. at 698-99.
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versed in part, and held that a federal court is neither a “department”
nor an “agency” under Section 1001, and thus the statute does not apply to false statements made in judicial proceedings.129 When
examining the legislative history, SCOTUS expounded that there is no
clear, express intent to depart from the definition of “department” expressed in the original false claims statute.130 As a result of the
Hubbard opinion, Congress passed legislation that replaced “any department or agency” with “the executive, legislative, or judicial branch
of the Government.”131 SCOTUS further explained that the original
false claims statute was narrow in scope with regard to bilking the government out of property or money.132 In response, Congress removed
the property and financial fraud requirement since there is a need to
“maintain[ing] the general good repute and dignity of . . . government
. . . service itself.”133 Thus, Congress has already amended Section
1001 with the intent to expand the scope of the statute to incorporate
all types of injury to the Government and the public.134 Moreover,
making false statements is considered a process crime.135 Process
crimes protect the criminal justice system,136 in which the public is a
major stakeholder.137 Therefore, since making false statements is a
crime under a regulatory statute that injures the public, it should be
considered a public welfare offense. SCOTUS proclaimed that when a
statute does not have a mens rea, it shall be interpreted that Congress
purposefully omitted this requirement.138 It logically follows that if
Congress wanted to add a mens rea, it would have done so. Since there

129. Id. at 715.
130. See id. at 703-04.
131. Pub. L. 104-292, 18 U.S.C.A § 1001 (West 1996). H.R. 3166, 104th Cong. (1996); S.
1734, 104th Cong. (1996); See generally Christopher E. Dominguez, Congressional Response
to Hubbard v. United States: Restoring the Scope of 18 U.S.C. 1001 and Codifying the “Judicial Function” Exception, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 523 (1997).
132. Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 706.
133. United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943).
134. See Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 706.
135. See generally Green, supra note 3.
136. Feinberg, supra note 5.
137. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (“Community participation in the
administration of the criminal law . . . is not only consistent with our democratic heritage
but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system.”).
138. See Behrman, 258 U.S. at 288 (“It is enough to sustain an indictment that the offense be described with sufficient clearness to show a violation of law, and to enable the
accused to know the nature and cause of the accusation and to plead the judgment, if one be
rendered, in bar of further prosecution for the same offense. If the offense be a statutory one,
and intent or knowledge is not made an element of it, the indictment need not charge such
knowledge or intent.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
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is no clear, express intent for the statute to have a mens rea, the statute should be interpreted accordingly.
IV. STANCE

OF THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

JUSTICE

There are several instances where the DOJ has weighed-in on
laws, positing what is constitutional or unconstitutional. This violates
the separation of powers.139 Congress makes laws and is part of the
Legislative Branch.140 “[T]he structure of the Constitution does not
permit the Congress to execute the laws; it follows that the Congress
cannot grant to an officer under its control what it does not possess.”141
The DOJ enforces laws and is part of the Executive Branch.142 When
the DOJ takes stances on what is and what is not constitutional, it
undermines the separation of powers and infringes on the powers of
the Legislative Branch.143
In June 2018, the DOJ announced that the individual mandate144 under the Affordable Care Act (the “ACA,” colloquially referred
to as Obamacare) is unconstitutional.145 Attorney General Jefferson
139. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (“[E]ach has one or more elements
which identify it as essentially a function of separation of powers. Prominent on the surface
of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”).
140. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States . . . .”).
141. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986).
142. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[T]ake care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .).
143. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726 (“To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in
an officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws.”) (By this same logic, vesting powers to the Executive
Branch, in this instance the DOJ, would reserve the right to the DOJ to make laws since
they are determining what is constitutional and what is not constitutional.).
144. Letter from Attorney General Jeff Sessions Re: Texas v. United States, No. 4: I 8-cv001 67-O (N.D. Tex.) (“After careful consideration, and with the approval of the President of
the United States, I have determined that, in Texas v. United States, No. 4: l 8-cv-00167-O
(N.D. Tex.), the Department will not defend the constitutionality of 26 U.S.C. 5000A(a), and
will argue that certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) are inseverable from
that provision. . . . A coalition of 20 States and two individuals has now brought suit against
the federal government, claiming that Section 5000A(a) is unconstitutional under NFIB in
light of the Jobs Act’s amendment to Section 5000A(c).”).
145. Eric Beech & Lisa Lambert, U.S. Justice Department Says Obamacare Individual
Mandate Unconstitutional, REUTERS (June 7, 2018, 9:48 PM) https://www.reuters.com/arti-
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Sessions issued a letter stating that the DOJ “will not defend the constitutionality of 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a), and will argue that certain
provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) are inseverable from that
provision” in a case pending in Federal District Court.146 In November
2018, after the Democratic Party won the majority in the House of Representatives, they announced they would investigate the DOJ’s
decision to not defend certain provisions.147 In December 2018, the
Federal District Court sided with the DOJ and found certain provisions of the ACA to be unconstitutional.148
The DOJ selecting which laws it finds to be constitutional and
unconstitutional places it in the precarious position of being
politicized. The Cable Television of Act of 1992 was enacted by Congress after it overrode the veto of President Bush,149 who considered
the “must-carry” provision unconstitutional.150 This was challenged in
Federal District Court, where the DOJ took the stance that it would
interpret the constitutionality of the “must-carry” provision to be “consistent with President Bush’s veto message.”151 After President William
Jefferson Clinton was elected, he reversed course and determined that
the “must-carry” provision should be defended in court.152 Consistent
with President Clinton’s message, the DOJ defended the “must-carry”
provision in court.153
cle/us-usa-healthcare/u-s-justice-department-says-obamacare-individual-mandateunconstitutional-idUSKCN1J4062.
146. Letter from Jefferson B. Session III, Att’y Gen., to Paul Ryan, Speaker, U.S. H.R.
(June 7, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1069806/download.
147. See David Morgan, House Democrats Target DOJ Decision Not to Defend Obamacare, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2018, 5:46 PM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congressobamacare/house-democrats-target-doj-decision-not-to-defend-obamacare-idUSK
CN1NO2M7.
148. See Eric Beech & Nate Raymond, Federal Judge Rules Obamacare Unconstitutional, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2018, 8:56 PM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-health
care-court/federal-judge-rules-obamacare-unconstitutional-idUSKBN1OE01Y.
149. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
150. S. DOC. NO. 102-29, at 1 (1992); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n, 810 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 (D.D.C. 1992).
151. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 810 F. Supp. 1308, 1312
(D.D.C. 1992).
152. Neal Devins and Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 507, 567–68 (“Fifteen years later, in a case involving the constitutionality of legislation mandating that cable television providers “must carry” certain stations, the Clinton
DOJ reversed the position of the Bush I Administration. President Bush thought the laws
unconstitutional, vetoed it on those grounds, and refused to defend it after Congress overrode his veto. President Clinton disagreed and directed his DOJ to defend the statute.”).
153. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 635 (1994)
(referring to the “federal defendants’ cross-motion to dismiss” the constitutional challenge).
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President Richard Milhous Nixon signed the Voting Rights Act,
which lowered the voting age to eighteen in state and local elections.154
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold opined that Congress did not have
the authority to enact this provision of the statute.155 This provision
was challenged in court.156 During oral arguments, Solicitor General
Griswold apprised SCOTUS of the conflicting views of President Nixon
and the DOJ, and even went so far as to urge SCOTUS to consider the
DOJ’s position that the statute is unconstitutional.157 This was attacked as being a less than zealous advocacy, as the Solicitor General
lobbied SCOTUS for the opposing party’s position.158
In another case, the DOJ took an even more extreme position of
not just abstaining from defending the constitutionality of a statutory
provision, but claiming a statutory provision to be unconstitutional in a
case they were not a party to.159 In Metro Broadcasting v. Federal
Communications Commission, the DOJ filed an amicus brief arguing
against the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from adulterating minority preference policies.160 SCOTUS disregarded the DOJ’s
amicus brief and held that the statutory provision is constitutional, but
would later reverse this decision in a subsequent case.161
Regarding Sections 1001 and 1035, the DOJ has taken a newfound stance on how these statutes should be interpreted. In United
States v. Ajoku, a nurse was indicted by a federal grand jury for health
care fraud, conspiracy to commit health care fraud, and false statements in violation of Section 1035.162 The nurse appealed her
conviction to SCOTUS, challenging the term “willfully” as used in Section 1035.163 The Solicitor General’s brief opposing certiorari admitted
154. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§ 301-302, 84 Stat.
314, 318 (1970) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §10301 (2014)).
155. See Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.
351 (1976) (statement of Erwin N. Griswold, Solicitor General of the United States).
156. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970).
157. Representation of Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 155.
158. Report of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Aff., No. 95-170, at 14 (1977).
159. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Metro
Broad. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453), 1989 WL 1126795 at
*1.
160. See id.
161. See Metro Broad. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
162. United States v. Ajoku, 718 F.3d 882, 886-87 (9th Cir. 2013).
163. Brief for the United States in Opposition, Ajoku v. United States, 572 U.S. 1056
(2014) (No. 13-7264), 2014 WL 1571930 at *8, *9.
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that the government’s interpretation of “willfully” in Sections 1001 and
1035 has changed.164 The Solicitor General argued that “willfully”
under Section 1035 does not require a “specific intent to deceive” and
that the government must prove that the defendant knew the statement was false and knew that making a false statement was
unlawful.165
In light of the Solicitor General’s newfound stance on the interpretation of “willfully,” SCOTUS granted the writ of certiorari, vacated
the judgment, and remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit for
further consideration consistent with the Solicitor General’s interpretation of “willfully” in his brief opposing certiorari.166 SCOTUS took
the aforementioned actions solely on the basis of the Solicitor General’s
brief. The DOJ’s obvious influence on courts is far too great. The DOJ
is now empowered to interpret laws in an argumentum ab auctoritate
manner, which is to say the DOJ is using its authority for the conclusion of the argument.167 The DOJ did not offer any evidence, fact,
research, or statistics, inter alia, to support its’ newfound stance on the
interpretation of “willfully.”
The Executive Branch making and interpreting laws is the beginning of a slippery slope. The roots of this may be traced to Solicitor
General Robert Bork, who stated:
[U]pon a sense of obligation to the Court and to the constitutional
system so that we often behave less like pure advocates than do
lawyers for private interests . . . . [I]t would seem to me not only
institutionally unnecessary but a betrayal of profound obligations
to the Court and to Constitutional processes to take the simplistic
position that whatever Congress enacts we will defend, entirely as
advocates for the client and without an attempt to present the issues in the round.168

Solicitor General Bork’s viewpoint is susceptible to political ideology.
We saw this transpire with the DOJ’s shifting views on the “mustcarry” provision as the White House went from a Republican President
164. See id. at *10 (“Upon further consideration, however, the government now agrees
that the correct interpretation of ‘willfully’ in Section 1035 is the one articulated in Bryan v.
United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998). To find that a defendant ‘willfully” ’made a false statement in violation of Section 1035, a jury must conclude ‘that he acted with knowledge that
his conduct was unlawful.’ The same interpretation should apply to 18 U.S.C. 1001’s materially identical prohibition on ‘knowingly and willfully’ making a false statement in a matter
within the jurisdiction of the federal government.”) (citations omitted).
165. Id. at *10, *11.
166. Ajoku v. United States, 572 U.S. 1056 (2014).
167. See DOUGLAS WALTON, INFORMAL LOGIC: A PRAGMATIC APPROACH, 210, 211 (Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 2008).
168. Letter from Robert H. Bork, Solic, Gen., to Simon Lazarus III, Esq. (Aug. 5, 1975).
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to a Democratic President.169 Forbye, members of the Executive
Branch making and interpreting laws is not limited to the Solicitor
General.
In August 2013, Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memo
that all federal prosecutors should omit the drug amounts in charging
documents so courts would not know if mandatory minimums would be
applicable to the sentencing.170 After leaving office, Holder would acknowledge that the purpose of his memo was to push forward an
agenda of President Barack Hussein Obama, even though there was
not enough support in Congress, namely from Republicans, to pass
sweeping legislation.171 After President Donald John Trump, a Republican, succeeded President Obama, he appointed Jefferson Sessions as
Attorney General who instructed federal prosecutors to disregard the
Holder memo and to pursue the most severe penalties possible, which
includes mandatory minimum sentencings.172 Attorney General Sessions promulgated that this policy will bring the DOJ back to
“enforcing the laws the Congress has passed.”173 Sessions’ position is
supported by the fact that Holder’s memo asked prosecutors to refrain
from performing a certain function of their job by not submitting drug
amounts in charging documents, and Holder’s admission in an op-ed
that President Obama, who appointed him, was frustrated that criminal justice reform could not be passed.174
We see that it is a dangerous precedent when the DOJ starts to
impose their views on what the laws should be and how they should be
169. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, supra note
149.
170. Memorandum from the Att’y Gen., Eric H. Holder, to the United States Attorney’s
and Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Crim. Division (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-policypon-chargingmandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum].
171. Eric H. Holder Jr., Eric Holder: We Can Have Shorter Sentences and Less Crime,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/opinion/sunday/eric-hholder-mandatory-minimum-sentences-full-of-errors.html. (“In February 2015, President
Obama convened a group of lawmakers—including the Republican senators Chuck Grassley
of Iowa and Rand Paul of Kentucky and the Democratic senators Dick Durbin of Illinois and
Cory Booker of New Jersey—to build support for sweeping reforms. But the momentum has
slowed thanks to opposition from a small group of Republican congressmen using language
dredged from the past. One, Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas, even claimed recently that
‘we have an under-incarceration problem.’”) (emphasis added).
172. Rebecca R. Ruiz, Attorney General Orders Tougher Sentences, Rolling Back Obama
Policy, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/us/politics/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-drug-offenses-penalties.html.
173. Id.
174. See Memorandum, supra note 170.
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interpreted, as the DOJ may then be weaponized to push a particular
political agenda. Courts should not defer to what the DOJ claims “willfully” means under Sections 1001 and 1035, as that is the job of
Congress and not the DOJ.
V. EXCULPATORY NO DOCTRINE
The “exculpatory no” doctrine is a creation of judicial activism.175 As such, various courts have varied the scope of the doctrine.
Some courts have held that Section 1001 does not extend to mere denials of guilt.176 The Fifth Circuit noted that Section 1001 comes
“uncomfortably close” to violating Fifth Amendment rights.177 Other
courts have limited the circumstances in which Section 1001 conflicts
with the Fifth Amendment.178 Some courts have held that there are no
limiting circumstances, and rather view the privilege against self-incrimination as a justification to further the reach of the “exculpatory
no” doctrine.179 However, this is an overbroad interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment, as “proper invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination allows a witness to remain
silent, but not to swear falsely. . . .”180
Courts that employed the “exculpatory no” doctrine went beyond the plain meaning of the statute and have not offered a canon of
construction for doing so. The “exculpatory no” doctrine was first ar175. United States v. Steele, 896 F.2d 998, 1007 (6th Cir. 1990) (Ryan, J., dissenting)
(“Over the years, judicial refusal to obey the command of § 1001 . . . was first given the name
an ‘exculpatory no’ statement, then labeled an ‘exception’ to the statute, and, finally, elevated to the stature of a ‘doctrine.’ And thus, it is that in a span of a few years a federal trial
court’s refusal to apply a criminal statute as written . . . became a judge-made ‘exception’ to
an Act of Congress and, for a touch of judicial legitimacy, was labelled a ‘doctrine.’”); see also
David Boies, Reflections on Bush v. Gore: The Role of the United States Supreme Court, 1
FLA. AGRIC. & MECHANICAL U.L. REV. 105, 108 (2006) (asserting that jurists can be classified as a “conservative-liberal” category, a “judicial activism-judicial restraint” category: “A
liberal judge can be an advocate of judicial activism, such as Earl Warren, or judicial restraint, such as Felix Frankfurter. The same is true for a conservative judge.”).
176. See, e.g., United States v. Medina De Perez, 799 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
United States v. Bush, 503 F.2d 813, 819 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Paternostro v. United
States, 311 F.2d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 1962).
177. United States v. Lambert, 501 F.2d 943, 946 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), abrogated by United States v. Rodriguez-Rios, 14 F.3d 1040 (5th Cir. 1994); see U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
178. See, e.g., United States v. King, 613 F.2d 670, 674, 675 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting the
“exculpatory no” doctrine does not apply if the defendant has been read their Miranda
rights).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 718-19 (11th Cir. 1986).
180. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 117 (1980).
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ticulated181 in United States v. Stark,182 when the court reasoned that
Congress intended the statute to “protect the government against false
pecuniary claims” and “to protect governmental agencies from perversion of their normal functioning.”183 In Stark, the court concluded that
Congress intended the scope of the statute to cover false statements
that are exculpatory responses to questioning initiated by government
agents.184
The Stark court inappropriately applied the ejusdem generis (“of
the same kinds, class, or nature”) canon of construction to Section 1001
in its analysis of the statute, which is the basis for the foundation of
the “exculpatory no” doctrine. The Scalia & Garner treatise opined on
applying ejusdem generis:
The ejusdem generis canon applies when a drafter has tacked on a
catchall phrase at the end of an enumeration of specifics, as in dogs,
cats, horses, cattle, and other animals. Does the phrase and other
animals refer to wild animals as well as domesticated ones? What
about a horsefly? What about protozoa? Are we to read other animals here as meaning other similar animals? The principle of
ejusdem generis says just that: It implies the addition of similar
after the word other.185

The Stark court reasoned that the word “statement” under Section 1001186 being interpreted according to ejusdem generis “does not
fairly apply to the kind of statement involved in this case where the
defendants did not volunteer any statement or representation for the
purpose of making claim upon or inducing improper action by the government against others.”187 First, ejusdem generis is not an
181. The term “exculpatory no” was first used in United States v. McCue, 301 F.2d 452,
455 (2d Cir. 1962). However, the exception to § 1001 liability was originally expressed in
United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955), and then Paternostro v. United
States, 311 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1962). See Lt. Col. Bart Hillyer & Maj. Ann D. Shane, The
“Exculpatory No:” Where Did It Go?, 45 A.F.L. Rev. 133, 13941 (1998).
182. United States v. Stark, 131 F. Supp. 190 (D. Md. 1955).
183. Id. at 205 (citing United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86 (1941)).
184. See id. at 205-06.
185. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, 199 (1st ed. 2012).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever,
in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the
Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully –(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers
up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious,
or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement
or entry; shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years . . . . ”) (emphasis
added).
187. Stark, 131 F. Supp. at 206.
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appropriate canon of construction because there is not a catchall
phrase and the end of an enumeration of specifics. Second, even if applying ejusdem generis to “statement” under Section 1001, it would
have to be with the words “representation” and “entry.” The Stark
court conflates the qualifiers (“false, fictitious, fraudulent”) with the
specifics (“statement” and “entry”). The qualifiers are adjectives; the
specifics are nouns. “False, fictitious, fraudulent” describe the type of
“statement” or “entry” which is being prohibited. “Statement” is an oral
response, and “entry” is a non-oral response, such as a written
response.
In Brogan v. United States,188 SCOTUS held that there is not
an “exculpatory doctrine” under Section 1001.189 When questioned as
to whether he accepted bribes from an employer, Brogan falsely responded with a simple “no.”190 SCOTUS rebuked lower courts for
interpreting the statute according to their own policy preferences, and
ultimately held that the plain language of the statute does not allow
for an “exculpatory no” doctrine.191
Reading “intent to deceive” into Section 1001 is beyond the
plain language of the statute, and similar to the “exculpatory no” doctrine. An ‘intent to deceive’ is another attempt for courts to reign in the
prosecutorial tool they may feel has too much reach. Notwithstanding,
SCOTUS has held against this and explicitly stated that “[c]ourts may
not create their own limitations on legislation.”192 Even if other courts
try to interpret Section 1001 through a canon of construction in order
to determine the intent of Congress, SCOTUS has declared that the
intent of Congress with regard to Section 1001 is to cover a broad range
of offenses and that the statute should be read as broadly as
possible.193
VI. INTERPRETING

THE

MATERIALITY REQUIREMENT

OF THE

STATUTE

There is still ambiguity about what constitutes materiality
under Section 1001. The purpose of the materiality requirement under
Section 1001 is to clarify the scope of the statute, so as to put parame188. United States v. Brogan, 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
189. Id. at 408.
190. Id. at 400.
191. Id. at 408 (“Because the plain language of § 1001 admits of no exception for an
‘exculpatory no,’ we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.”).
192. Id. (“Courts may not create their own limitations on legislation, no matter how
alluring the policy arguments for doing so, and no matter how widely the blame may be
spread.”).
193. United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 480 (1984).
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ters around the reach of prosecutors.194 Some scholars have concurred
with SCOTUS’s plain meaning interpretation of the statute in Brogan,195 but felt that the defendant’s false statement did not meet the
threshold of materiality since the government did not show that their
investigation was impeded.196 Notwithstanding, it should be noted
that at the time Brogan was convicted Section 1001 did not have the
materiality requirement.197 Before the statute was amended in 1996,
the Second Circuit held that materiality was not an element since it
was not written in the statute.198 Thus, a plain meaning of the interpretation would not have a materiality requirement, and the
government would not have to show that their investigation had been
impeded.
In 1995, the question before SCOTUS was whether it is constitutional or unconstitutional for a judge to refuse to allow a jury to
determine the question of materiality under Section 1001.199 In United
States v. Gaudin, the majority opinion blazons that “[i]t is uncontested
that conviction under this provision requires that the statements be
‘material’ to the Government inquiry, and that ‘materiality’ is an element of the offense that the Government must prove.”200 However, in a
concurring opinion Chief Justice Rehnquist states that “[t]he Court
does not resolve that conflict; rather, it merely assumes that materiality
is, in fact, an element of the false statement clause of § 1001.”201 It may
194. Nathan Edwards, Brogan v. United States: A Critical Response to the Supreme
Court’s Analysis of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 147, 187 (1999) (warning that
“§ 1001 will lurk in the repertoire of the ‘over-zealous prosecutor.’”) (citing Petitioner’s Brief
at 18, Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998) (No. 96-1579)); see also Geraldine Szott
Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar Criminal Law, 43 HOUS.
L. REV. 591, 619 (2006).
195. Edwards, supra note 194; see also Harry E. Garner, Criminal Law–18 U.S.C.
1001–Abrogation of the “Exculpatory No” Doctrine, 66 TENN. L. REV. 561, 593 (1999).
196. Garner, supra note 195.
197. At the time defendant Brogan was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provided: “Whoever,
in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States
knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or
makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than five years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was amended in 1996, which added the
materiality requirement to every subsection under section (a); see also United States v. Brogan, 522 U.S. 398, 400 (1998).
198. United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir. 1984) (“It is settled in this
Circuit that materiality is not an element of the offense of making a false statement in
violation of § 1001.”).
199. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 507 (1995).
200. Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
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be inferred that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s view is that materiality was
not an element because it was not in the statute at the time, and thus
he utilized a plain meaning interpretation of the statute.
The term material may sometimes be confused with relevancy,
but they are two very different legal terms.202 SCOTUS has defined
material as “a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was
addressed.”203 This definition is quite broad, and a plain meaning interpretation of “influence, or [be] capable of influencing,” does not
require evidence that the false statement actually influences the
government.204
The relevant part of Section 1001 states, “makes any materially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation.” If the Series-Qualifier Canon were used to interpret the statute, the term
materially would be construed in consistency with the interpretation of
the term “statement.”205 The term “statement” has been interpreted
according to its plain meaning by courts, and has come to encompass
those that are oral,206 written,207 sworn,208 unsworn,209 voluntary,210
202. Weinstock v. United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. (1956) (“‘Material’ when
used in respect to evidence is often confused with ‘relevant’, but the two terms have wholly
different meanings. To be ‘relevant’ means to relate to the issue. To be ‘material’ means to
have probative weight, i. e., reasonably likely to influence the tribunal in making a determination required to be made. A statement may be relevant but not material. Professor
Wigmore depicts with some acerbity the difference between relevancy and materiality, ‘the
inaccuracy of our usage’ of the terms, and ‘the harmfulness of this inveterate error’. Materiality, he maintains, is a matter of substantive law and does not involve the law of evidence.
He does not include “materiality” in the topics treated in his volumes on Evidence.”).
203. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509; see also Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)
(“The most common formulation of that understanding [of the materiality concept] is that a
concealment or misrepresentation is material if it ‘has a natural tendency to influence, or
was capable of influencing, the decision of’ the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.’”); see, e.g., Weinstock, 231 F.2d at 702 n.6.
204. United States v. Edgar, 82 F.3d 499, 510 (1st Cir. 1996) (declaring that “[T]he standard is not whether there was actual influence, but whether it would have a tendency to
influence.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Trent, 949 F.2d 998, 999 (8th Cir.
1991) (holding that there is no reliance requirement because materiality only demands the
ability to influence the government) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Grizzle, 933
F.2d 943, 948 (11th Cir. 1991).
205. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, supra note 185, at 147 (“When there is a
straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series.”).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 840 F.2d 697, 700-01 (9th Cir.
1988).
207. See, e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
208. See, e.g., Id.
209. See, e.g., United States v. Des Jardins, 772 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1985).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Adler, 380 F.2d 917, 922 (2d Cir. 1967).
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and on government documents for birth certificates,211 passports,212
residency,213 and finances.214 Thus, applying the Series-Qualifier Canon to interpret the statute, “materially” and “statement” would be
defined in a “straightforward, parallel construction,” which does not
require that the government provide evidence that it has been influenced by the false statement.
While “capable of influencing” may be a low threshold,215 it is
nonetheless the threshold that the statute prescribes. There is still a
circuit split as to whether materiality is a question of law or a question
of fact. A majority of the courts hold that it is a question of law, but a
minority of courts have taken the position that it should be decided by
a trier of fact.
CONCLUSION
While SCOTUS and the DOJ agree that Sections 1001 and 1035
confer extraordinary authority on prosecutors,216 this is what a plain
meaning interpretation of the statutes prescribes. Reigning in this extraordinary authority is an issue for Congress, not for our courts.
When courts tried to reign in this extraordinary authority under the
“exculpatory no” doctrine, SCOTUS eventually rejected it.217 Reviewing the legislative history, Congress tried to limit the scope by adding a
property and financial fraud requirement in order to limit the reach of
211. See, e.g., United States v. Montemayor, 712 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1983).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 915 F.2d 774, 775 (1st Cir. 1990).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 728 F.2d 1359, 1362-63 (11th Cir. 1984).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Leal, 30 F.3d 577, 584 (5th Cir. 1994) (false statements on
invoices made to the Small Business Administration); see also United States v. Kneen, 889
F.2d 770, 773 (8th Cir. 1989) (false statements made on expense reports to the Internal
Revenue Service).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Alemany Rivera, 781 F.2d 229, 235 (1st Cir. 1985) (“[T]he
test for materiality under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is . . . whether [the statement] had the capacity
to influence a government function.”); see also United States v. Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272,
1278 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The false statement must simply have the capacity to impair or pervert the functioning of a government agency.”); see also United States v. White, 270 F.3d
356, 365 (6th Cir. 2001) (“‘[M]ateriality’ is a fairly low bar . . . . [T]he government must
present at least some evidence showing how the false statement in question was capable of
influencing federal functioning.”) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Moore, 446
F.3d 671, 681 (7th Cir. 2006) (statement is material if it “has a natural tendency to influence, or . . . is capable of affecting, a government function.”); see also United States v.
Calhoon, 97 F.3d 518, 530 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is enough if the statements had a ‘natural
tendency to influence, or [were] capable of affecting or influencing a government
function.’”).
216. See Brogan v. United States , 522 U.S. 398, 408 (1998); See Am. Surety Co. of N.Y.
v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1925).
217. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
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prosecutors.218 The statute was easily gamed, and Congress then removed the property and financial fraud requirement.219 Now, it is
being claimed again that the statute gives prosecutors extraordinary
authority, which should be limited. If Congress intended to limit the
reach of the statute, it could define “materially,”220 as courts have interpreted the term with a low threshold.221 Nevertheless, this is not an
issue for our courts, as limiting the reach of prosecutors by holding
that the statute requires specific intent goes beyond a plain meaning
interpretation.
218. Act of Oct. 23, supra note 11.
219. Act of June 18, supra note 16.
220. United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting “Section 1001
does not define ‘materially false.’”).
221. See cases cited supra note 215.
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